aBstract. This note explains the new legal initiatives in the regulation of private corporate bribery in Brazil. Corruption is an endemic problem in many States, including ones with an emerging economy such as Brazil. The development and implementation of anticorruption policies necessarily goes through Klitgaard's "Principal-Agent-Client" model. According to 
Long perceived as a highly corrupt country, Brazil has recently embarked on a journey toward anti-corruption. In early 2012, the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled on the most high-profile case in its history and sent several congressmen and leading figures of the ruling political party involved in corruption to jail. More recently, ordinary citizens in different Brazilian cities have gone to the streets to protest against the President of the Senate regarding charges of corruption. Simultaneously, foreign governments and international organizations have increased pressure to make the end of corruption a top government priority. In response to these claims, Brazil has ratified the most important anti-corruption treaties and has implemented changes in its internal laws to set the country in the right direction.
The changes underway are grounded on the perception that corruption affects everyone in the country: from the poorest to the richest, and its consequences, in the long run, are welfare reducing.
1 The private sector is surely not excluded from the corruption equation, bribery being the most common type of corrupt activity affecting corporations. For that reason, all the international treaties Brazil has ratified and the proposed changes in its domestic laws in the area of corruption are aimed at bribery, and more precisely, at the bribe payer.
In this note, we address the status of Brazilian law in relation to corporate bribery. The note is structured in four sections and a conclusion. In Section 1, we start by defining corruption and demonstrating that bribery is one of the many forms in which corruption can occur. We frame the bribery dynamics under the "Principal-Agent-Client" approach, indicating the importance of placing strong emphasis on the role played by the client, i.e., the bribe-payer/ the corporation, in the design of anti-bribery policies. Section 2 captures the historical lack of Brazilian anti-corruption laws that have an impact on corporations in Brazil. Section 3 deals with companies connected to Brazil in some way that have been investigated and prosecuted in foreign jurisdictions under corruption charges. Section 4 focuses on the Brazilian recent experience concerning institutional changes and the approval of a new anti-bribery law.
ii. corruPtion and corPorate BriBery
Corruption is an endemic problem present in many countries, including emerging economies such as Brazil. Defined as the "abuse of public office for private gain" 2 and perceived as a major obstacle to development, corruption has long been associated with the inappropriate use of public funds, 3 frauds and other anti-competitive conducts, 6 and a decrease in foreign direct investment inflows.
7 As a product of human creativity, corruption can take several forms, the most common being patronage, embezzlement, trading influence, abuse of functions and, of course, bribery.
8
This note employs the term bribery to refer to "use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust."
9 Reports of bribery have existed since the beginning of human history in different cultures around the globe.
10 (Public) bribery 11 is a result of constant interaction between public and private interests within the structure of the State. Accordingly, there will be incentives for corrupt practices whenever a public authority exercises her or his discretion on the distribution of a benefit, or a cost to the private sector.
12 In other words, on one side of the bargain, there is the State, empowered to buy and sell goods and services, offer concessions and distribute subsidies [benefits] , as well as to collect taxes, enforce regulations and require authorizations [costs] . On the other side, there is the private sector, with economic power and willing to pay for benefits or to reduce costs. Given the central role of the State in many countries and the great influence of the private sector in most countries of the world, the existence of bribery -at varying degrees-is intuitive.
Scholars have long been concerned with bribery as a public policy issue and in response, have created models to help understand and solve briberyrelated problems. One way of approaching the bribery dynamics is through the "Principal-Agent-Client" model proposed by Klitgaard. 13 The "principal" is portrayed as a superior officer in the public administration; the "agent" as a petty officer acting as a liaison between the "principal" and the "client;" and the "client" is represented by the private sector. "Principal," "agent" and "client" hold different interests.
The "principal," who is responsible for creating and implementing anticorruption policies, should have knowledge that the "agent" balances the benefits of taking a bribe against the costs of being caught. Meanwhile, the "client" feels compelled to corrupt the "agent" in order to obtain benefits un-less he can foresee real chances of being punished. Accordingly, corruption can be defined as a "crime of calculation" and a matter of opportunity. 14 Traditionally, policy makers and scholars have centered their anti-bribery efforts on the role of the "agent," in this case, the "bribe taker." Despite the undeniable importance of this strategy, a more comprehensive approach has been widely adopted in recent years. This new approach emphasizes the role of the "client" (the "bribe payer") in the bribery dynamics since the private sector plays a fundamental role of providing economic resources for the machinery of corruption.
Milton Friedman once said that the "only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits."
15 This assertion reflects the economic rationale that drives enterprises, but does not correspond to today's societal expectations on the behaviour or the private sector. Nowadays, the concept of governance prevails: the problems of society shall not be administered only by the State, but also by private actors, at local and global levels. 16 In a governance environment, companies should be accountable for the impact their "activities may have on the social, political, economic and development aspects of society."
17
Under this new approach, the accountability for monitoring corrupt practices is shared by the State and corporations. It is the State's responsibility to create a system of incentives and punishments to render corruption less attractive to corporations. The development of anti-corruption laws focused on business practices can be an important mechanism for this purpose. NGO committed to stopping corruption and promoting transparency, Brazil scored 4.3 in its corruption perception index, 20 which places the country closer to highly corrupt than to clean. Although Brazil has ratified the most important international anti-corruption treaties, 21 the country has an incomplete legal framework on matters related to bribery. While its laws punish public servants involved in corrupt practices, they undermine the role of businesses in this process. Until 2013, there were few laws that could be enforced against "clients," which clearly shows that the Brazilian anti-corruption laws and policies then in place contradicted the theoretical model proposed by Klitgaard.
At first, Brazil did not possess strong substantive laws to punish individuals and corporations engaged in bribery. Over the course of regulating this matter, the country has legislated in a piecemeal manner. 
29
The objective of the Administrative Misconduct Law is to prevent and punish acts of this type. The focus lies on the public sector, but civil sanctions against private actors are extended only if a private actor instigates, aids or benefits from an act of misconduct committed by the public servant. Since punishment is conditioned upon proof of actual misconduct, a burden rarely met, this law does little to combat corruption in businesses in Brazil.
In sum, these laws are clearly insufficient to establish an effective deterrent system against bribery. The current Criminal Code is unable to establish an effective system of criminal liability for corporations engaging in bribery. Although it imposes fines and temporary suspensions from contracting with the public administration, Law 8.666 is too limited in its scope to be able to change the status quo. The Administrative Misconduct Law, the scope of which is more general, does little to punish corrupt corporations, for the standards currently in place for burden of proof are so high that they are only rarely met. Not without reason did OECD experts recently conclude that 25 Despite the lack of bribery laws applicable to "clients" in Brazil, Brazilian corporations have been at least indirectly subject to investigation and sanctions in foreign jurisdictions, as a result of the extraterritorial aspect of foreign anti-bribery laws. The most effective legal system against bribery committed by Brazilian corporations is exercised by the United States with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [FCPA] , a statute that punishes U.S. corporations and foreign companies connected to U.S. jurisdiction 31 engaged in bribery abroad.
32 Several cases can be cited to illustrate this situation. The cases that follow describe instances in which American parent companies of Brazilian affiliates were investigated, and some were even punished for corrupt practices incurred by their affiliates. Although the Brazilian affiliates were not directly involved in the litigation, indirect consequences, such as firing employees with dirty hands, changing the internal structure of the corporation, improving internal control systems against bribery and so forth, should have ensued.
The first such case that effectively stopped bribery involving a Brazilian company took place in the safety equipment manufacturing business. In 2006, Tyco International faced prosecution by U.S. authorities when it bought a Brazilian company, Earth Tech Brazil, which was accused of corruption in Brazil.
33 A $51 million fine followed. Similarly, in 2009, Nature's Sunshine Products, a company in the business of health supplements, had to pay a $600,000 fine for acts committed by its Brazilian subsidiary. Nature's Sunshine Products was sued before a U.S. court after it was revealed that its Brazilian affiliate had bribed customs officials to ease restrictions on its products. Presently, a bribery investigation is underway against EMBRAER, a giant Brazilian aircraft manufacturer. EMBRAER is subject to the U.S. FCPA since its shares are issued and traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Following the United States' footsteps and with stronger anti-bribery laws in place, several other jurisdictions are directing their investigations and enforcement mechanisms against Brazilian corporations that are allegedly engaged in bribery. According to a 2011 Transparency International report, 36 four Brazilian corporations were investigated for corruption in the United Nations "Oil-for-Food" program. 37 Charges of bribery committed by Brazilian corporations in Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Italy and Russia have also been reported. 40 and the Federal District already include this information in their information systems. In the future, a public administrator from any part of Brazil will be able to access this database and prevent these companies from participating in government contracts. On the other hand, if substantive anti-corruption laws have limited effectiveness, there is only so much the Office of the Comptroller General can do.
Repeated bribery condemnations from abroad, and international and internal pressure for a bribery-free country seemed to have echoed in the Brazilian legislative branch recently. After three years of discussions, Law No. 12.846, 41 which deals with civil and administrative corporate liability involving corrupt practices, was approved by Congress and will enter into force in 2014. Originally proposed by former President Lula da Silva, this law is the result of a joint initiative between the Office of the Comptroller General, the Ministry of Justice and the Office of Federal Public Advocacy.
Law No. 12.846 creates a strict liability regime for corporate entities that engage in bribery or procurement fraud. The administrative penalties provided in the Law include fines from 0.1% up to 20% of the gross sales of the previous year, and publication of the decision in the press, which in turn affects the company's image. According to the text of this law, penalties may be milder upon the proven existence of "integrity mechanisms, audit and whistle blowing, and proof of implementation of codes of ethics" within the corporation. This requirement would fall under the category of a "compliance program." This law also has a section on "leniency agreements." In other words, by signing an agreement, a corporation can avoid severe penalties after pledging to cease corrupt practices and agreeing to cooperate with public authorities on the identification of irregularities. At a federal level, the Office also fulfills the important role of being the representative of Brazilian government in global forums that discuss corruption. 40 Prior to being approved, Law No. 12.846 generated much debate in Brazil. Appraising the initiative, the Brazilian Institute for Business Law [IBRADEMP], a non-profit organization, highlighted the importance of an anti-bribery system based on compliance programs which transfers part of the cost of corruption prevention to corporations. However, the Institute notes that, unlike from anti-bribery laws in force in other countries, the Brazilian Law does not provide for a minimum requirement in compliance programs, nor does it clearly define what the exact benefits accrued from maintaining such programs are. 42 It bears mentioning that although a compliance mechanism is not yet provided in Brazilian laws, several corporations with activities in the country, especially those aimed at foreign markets, have already adopted such programs. Large auditing companies and specialized law firms offer this service to Brazilian corporations. 43 
vi. concLusion
Brazil seems to have finally embarked on the difficult journey to eliminate corporate bribery. Such a journey started with the adoption of criminal, administrative, and civil sanctions for those who chose to engage in such activities. Unfortunately, the results of these early laws demonstrate that they have not been sufficient to achieve the overall goal of the elimination of corporate bribery. Part of the reason for this unsuccessful story may have to do with the fact that these statutes were not addressed to the specific case of corporate bribery as such. In addition, some of the flaws of these laws may be attributed to their content and others to matters involving procedure. In terms of procedure, the creation of Brazil's first governmental body specialized in anti-corruption policies, the Office of Comptroller General, certainly makes a positive difference. In terms of substance, the approval of Law No. 12.846 marks unprecedented progress for Brazil. It is the first statute in the country's history to target the "client" in the bribery equation, as prescribed by gaard's theoretical model. It does so through a system of disincentives and benefits, which involves heavy sanctions for bribe payers and advantages for those companies that conduct their activities ethically. Law No. 12.846 also innovates by adopting compliance mechanisms and "leniency agreements." Although this new legal framework looks good on paper, its actual capacity to dissuade corporate bribery is yet to be seen.
